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SUNSHINE PATRIOT OR COLD WAR CASUALTY?: AN
EXAMINATION OF WRONGFUL EXPOSURE SUITS BROUGHT
BY NUCLEAR COMPLEX EMPLOYEES
CHRISTOPHER S. TURNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly forty years, Harold Hargan was a faithful and
patriotic employee of Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plan, one of the
many plants in the U.S. nuclear weapons industry chain of
production.' For the majority of his career, Hargan cleaned uranium
coated equipment and filters at the C-400 decontamination complex.2
Although he often described his former place of employment as dirty
and loud, Hargan was grateful for his job and he felt a sense of
purpose behind the part he played in our nation's defense.
3
Hargan's patriotism changed to bitterness, however, when he
developed bladder cancer in 1992, a condition Hargan believes was
caused by over-exposure to radioactive elements and chemical
solvents used in the plant. 4 Now Hargan and 700 of his fellow
Paducah plant workers and their families have filed suit against their
former employer.5 The class-action lawsuit, initiated in the fall of
2000, seeks $10 billion in damages and alleges that exposure to
plutonium and other highly radioactive elements put workers at risk
of developing cancers and caused emotional distress.
6
The Paducah suit is not unique. In the past, defense industry
workers have filed numerous radiation exposure suits against their
employers.7 In the process, the U.S. Government and its private
subcontractors have paid out millions of dollars in settlement awards
8and damages. Collectively, the suits have led to the downfall of the
once magnificent U.S. nuclear weapons complex. As the complex
lies in shambles, questions of long buried secrets and government
cover-ups remain unanswered. In Paducah, and at similar facilities
'Senior Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW. B.A., Hanover College, 1998; J.D., University of Kentucky, 2001.
'James Malone, Cold War Poison, The Paducah Legacy, Former Worker Now
Believes Paycheck Came With a Price, He Developed Bladder Cancer, Lung Disease, COURIER







'See Associated Press, Weapons Plants a Costly Problem Across the Country,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sep. 25, 1999.
5See id.
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across the country, courts and commentators are trying to answer the
question of whether former weapons complex workers are 'sunshine
patriots' or cold war casualties.
In order to understand the complex issues involved in
radiation exposure litigation this Note traces the history of worker
exposure suits, from their initiation at the Fernald, Ohio disaster9 to
the off-shoot cases that have cropped up at similar facilities in other
states and towns. Second, it explores in greater detail the history and
catalyst of the present Paducah litigation as well as the outcomes of
related Paducah legal actions. Third, to provide even greater
perspective, this Note provides a description of the complex chain
that at one time composed the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex.
Fourth, and finally, this Note examines the many legal issues
involved in worker exposure cases, which in turn provides a detailed
forecast of the ongoing Paducah litigation.
II. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
COMPLEX
If the rapid decline of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex can
be traced to a single precipitous event, it was the December 7, 1984
dust collector incident at the Feed Materials Production Center
(FMPC) in Fernald, Ohio. 10 Femald was one of the smaller
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons facilities." The main
function of the facility was to manufacture uranium metal and
uranium chemical compounds for use in the other nuclear weapons
facilities, chiefly the gaseous diffusion plants like Paducah.12 The
FMPC was located seventeen miles northwest of downtown
Cincinnati. 3
The FMPC at Fernald had already been in operation for over
10,000 days on December 7, 1984.14 It was on this particular day,
however, that the chain of events that would signal the demise of the
U.S. nuclear weapons complex began to unfold. 15 On the morning of
91d.
,'Weldon J. Adams, The Great Fernald Hoax: How the Department of Energy, the
Politicians, and the News Media Created a Nuclear Moment Out of a Nuclear Molehill 7 (Feb.
29, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Note author).
"Id.
121d. The materials produced at Femald were not used directly in the manufacturing
of nuclear weapons. Instead, they were base or feed materials. For this reason, the official
name of the Fernald plant was the Feed Materials Production Center or FMPC.
1
3Id. The plant's geographic location and its surrounding demography would play
key factors in the public reaction to the dust collector incident. Because, unlike many other
facilities within the chain, Stet was not central to the local economy's survival, the Cincinnati





December 7, high ranking plant officials received a report from
operations personnel at the FMPC's Plant 9.16 The report stated that
a significant amount of material had been lost from one of the plant's
dust collectors.17 Most of the dust collected in Plant 9 was a slightly
radioactive material known as black oxide or triuranium octaoxide.'
8
For whatever reason, one of the plant's dust collectors had become
dislodged from its moorings and for approximately two and a half
months had been spewing black oxide dust into the atmosphere over
the plant.' 9 Officials would later conclude that about 270 pounds of
uranium had escaped due to the leak.20
What was most significant about the leak was the eventual
media, political and legal hailstorm that would ensue from the press
release concerning its existence. This single, seemingly insignificant
event of reporting a minor leak in one of the plant's dust collectors
would unleash rounds of investigation into the plant's operations,
unprecedented media and political attention, and years of protracted
litigation. Eventually, the FMPC would cease its operations and the
DOE and its private contractors would pay millions of dollars in
settlement funds to plant workers and those living nearby the plant.2 '
The Fernald incident was merely the proverbial tip of the
iceberg. The FMPC's demise would lead to the collapse of several
other nuclear facilities within the DOE's nuclear weapons production
chain. In addition to Fernald, lawsuits have been filed at the Mound
Plant in Miamisburg, Ohio, the Rocky Flats facility near Denver,
Colorado, the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Richland, Washington,
and the Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky.22 At the
Mound Plant, which made detonators for nuclear bombs, the "[DOE]
has offered to settle a worker lawsuit by paying $926,000 and
providing health insurance coverage for current and former
workers. ' ,23 At the Rocky Flats facility, which made triggers for
nuclear bombs, a whistleblower suit claiming fraudulent
misrepresentations by the plant's contractor, Rockwell International
Corp., has led to a $4.2 million court award.24 Additionally,
"Rockwell has pleaded guilty to 10 hazardous waste and clean water
"Id. at8.
"Id.
"Adams supra note 10, at 8; The level of danger the material presented to the public
at large is a matter of speculation among scientists, and was a heavily litigated issue in several
lawsuits. According to plant officials, black oxide is one of the least threatening materials
processed at any nuclear weapons or nuclear power manufacturing center. It is approximately
15% more radioactive than unenriched uranium, or uranium found in its natural state.
'9M.20
1d. at 9.21 
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violations and has paid $18.5 million in fines. ', 25  At the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation the government alleged that the health of 14,000
people living downwind from the facility had been harmed.
26 And
finally, at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), workers are
claiming that they were not warned about risks of contamination and
allege that material was dumped in an unauthorized landfill and in
woodland areas that are now part of a state wildlife park.
27 The
alleged inattention to safety and health issues at nuclear weapons
facilities has cost the federal government more than $70 million in
defense and settlement fees.
28
The downfall of the PGDP mirrors the decline of its sister
facilities. The precipitous event was the August 1988 discovery of
groundwater contamination near the PGDP.2
9 The preliminary report
indicated that the contamination affected several nearby residential
drinking wells. 30  An analysis revealed "elevated levels of
technetium3' and trichloroethylene 32 in a groundwater plume which
extended in a northeasterly direction from the 
plant boundary."
33
Similar to the preceding incidents at other facilities, the press release
saying that the PGDP was leaking dangerous substances into the
community at large received an onslaught of media, political and
legal attention. Accordingly, operations at the PGDP would never be
the same.
Ill. THE LITIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION
PLANT
The litigious history of the PGDP can be subdivided into
three principal eras. The first era, composed of toxic torts filed by
nearby landowners, was spurred by the 1988 discovery of
groundwater contamination near the plant.
34  The second era was
initiated by a whistle-blower complaint that accused several plant
operators of concealing high levels of radioactive 
contamination. 35




27Weapons Plants a Costly Problem, supra note 7.
2
81d.
"ILamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 960 (W.D. Ky.
1993). 3°1d.
31id at 961. Technetium is a radioactive byproduct of uranium fission. It was
introduced to the PGDP through the use of uranium residues obtained from reactors at the
Savannah River and Hanford facilities.32
Tricholoethylene is a cleaning solvent that had long been used at the plant. Id.
33id.
'See Id.
"See Tom Loftus, Federal Judge Unseals Lawsuit Filed by Three Workers at
Paducah Plant, COURIER J. (Louisville), Aug. 13 1999, available at 1999 WL 5667155.
[VOL. 16:2
WRONGFUL EXPOSURE SUITS
In a class action suit, former PGDP workers alleged they were
wrongfully exposed to harmful levels of radioactivity.
6
Following the 1988 discovery of groundwater contamination
near the Paducah facility, plaintiffs William Lamb, Frances Lamb and
Ronald Lamb filed suit against PGDP operators Martin Marietta
Energy Systems, Inc. and Union Carbide Corporation." The suit
alleged that the plaintiffs' property and health had been harmed by
the defendants' release of radioactive substances into the
environment surrounding the plant.3  More specifically, the
complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleged ordinary negligence, strict
liability based upon the exercise of abnormally dangerous or
ultrahazardous activities, private nuisance, and punitive damages for
willful, wanton and grossly negligent conduct. All three plaintiffs
own property near the plant and one of the plaintiffs, Ronald Lamb,
owned an automotive repair shop nearby.40
The defendants filed two motions for summary judgment in
the action. The Defendants prevailed on their first motion regarding
the plaintiffs' claims for personal injury.41 The court found that the
plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of both present injury and
future risk of injury from the released contaminants.42 The second
summary judgement motion was likewise successful. 43 As to the
plaintiffs' property damage claims, the court held that state law
permitted no recovery for property value diminution where the level
of contamination alleged was well below federally mandated safety
levels."
The second grouping of suits in the Paducah litigation
trilogy, however, would prove more bothersome to the defendants.
The charges were serious. A fifty-page lawsuit filed on June 1, 1999
accused operator Lockheed Martin Corporation,45 and its predecessor
corporation, of mishandling radioactive materials, exposing workers
to unnecessary and unlawful levels of radioactivity, and concealing
high levels of radioactive contamination at the plant." The suit was
brought under a federal statute that allows employees to collect
3See Associated Press. Lawsuit Filed Against Operators Of Uranium Enrichment
Plant, AssociATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Sep. 3, 1999.




41Id. at 970.42Associated Press, supra note 36. Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta to form
Lockheed Martin Corporation.
43
Loftus, supra note 35.
OId. at 970.
45
Associated Press, supra note 36.
46
Loftus, supra note 35.
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payment for exposing fraud against the government.
47 The U.S.
Justice Department has yet to decide whether to join the suit in order
to recover fraudulently obtained federal monies.
48
More significantly, the whistle-blower action filed in June of
1999 has led to two employee class action suits as well as
investigations by both the federal government and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.49 The first employee exposure suit was
filed in September of 1999.5o The suit alleges that radiation levels at
the PGDP "exceeded federal standards and were severe enough to
cause fear and concern among workers and increase their risk of
becoming ill."51 The suit was filed on behalf of fourteen former
PGDP workers, but it seeks to represent all current workers and their
families, which could mean a list of more than 10,000 people.
5 2 The
1999 claim has since been re-filed in a second suit on August 7,
2000,53 adding more allegations and defendants to the original
complaint.5 4 The new lawsuit makes more specific allegations than its
sister suit and seeks to name a smaller class 
of workers. 55
Specifically, the suit accuses plant operators of causing their
employees to develop rare brain tumors as a result of radiation
exposure.5 6 Accordingly, the suit seeks to represent all former and
current PGDP employees who have developed tumors as a result of
radiation exposure.
5 7
The employee suits filed in Paducah follow a nationwide
trend of nuclear litigation, and are the focus of this Note. How early
investigations into the PGDP's activities eventually culminated in the
filing of twin employee exposure suits has previously been discussed.
Just as significant, however, is the story of the nuclear weapons
complex and its downfall. Before this Note explores the strictly legal
ramifications of employee exposure suits, it first takes a necessary
exploration into the factual background of the employee suits: a
description of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
471d.
481d.
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IV. THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
A. Overview of the Complex
Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the
1950's the U.S. was confident in its military position. This sense of
confidence was predicated on the fact that the U.S. remained the
world's sole nuclear power. When the Soviets detonated a nuclear
device in September of 1949, however, tremendous pressure was
placed on the U.S. to quickly assemble a nuclear complex capable of
producing large stockpiles of bombs in a relatively short amount of
time.58 Most U.S. leaders believed that the U.S. could cede its
shortcomings in land based weaponry and artillery if it could produce
high quantities of "nukes" that could be delivered over long
distances. 9
Unfortunately, in 1950, the U.S. possessed a very limited
capacity for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. 60 The existing
facilities were too small and too few in numbers to meet the demands
of the burgeoning Cold War.6' It would take a significant effort and
expenditure to start a program capable of producing the quantities of
weapons desired by military leaders.
The creation of an entire nuclear weapons industry, however,
was no small matter. Each device would require an immense amount
of special material that required the processing of raw uranium ore
into a host of exotic nuclear materials. 62 Many of these materials did
not even exist prior to the dawn of the nuclear age.63 Accordingly,
over 90% of the new weapons facilities would process and produce
nuclear materials. 64 Only the remaining 10% of the program would
be devoted to the actual assembly of the bombs.
65
By the end of 1959, the total cost of building the complex
was $8 billion.66 Six of the $8 billion was spent on processing
plants.67 The Oak Ridge, Tennessee facility, home to the Manhattan
Project, was the crown jewel of the complex. Investment in Oak
Ridge alone totaled $1.5 billion, while nearly equal sums were spent
on processing plants at Hanford, Washington and Savannah River,
"
8
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Georgia.68  Approximately $750 million was spent on the new
gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah, Kentucky and Waverly, 
Ohio.69
One hundred million dollars was spent on the FMPC at Femald,
Ohio,70 and $60 million was spent on a similar facility near St. Louis,
Missouri. 7' By contrast, only $30 million was spent on the Pantax
facility in Texas where the bombs were finally assembled.
72
B. Inside the Bomb"
All nuclear weapons require fissionable material as their core
component. Simply stated, nuclear fission is the process by which
atoms of a radioactive isotope naturally disintegrate into atoms of two
new elements. 74  This process of disintegration converts existing
particles of mass into enormous amounts of energy as new lighter
particles are formed.75  Essentially, only one naturally occurring
element, Uranium 235, fissions. 76  However, other fissionable
materials can be manufactured.77
During the fission process many neutrons are ejected, as the
original atom disintegrates and two new atoms form.
78 These ejected
neutrons travel with considerable force and velocity.
79 Due to the
force and velocity at which these neutrons travel, they are able to
invade the nuclei of nearby atoms.80 This process is called a chain
reaction.8' The mass and density necessary for a chain reaction is









'The following discussion is intended to briefly explain the inner workings of a
nuclear bomb. For the sake of relevance and brevity, explanations of hydrogen bombs and
thermonuclear devices have been omitted. Nonetheless, the following discussion should
provide a valuable factual context for an understanding of the role of the PGDP, which is a
necessary step in understanding the suits now being pursued.74
Radioactivity is the natural phenomenon by which certain elements spontaneously,
but very slowly, disintegrate. In radioactive disintegration both energy and particles are
emitted. The particles emitted are invariably one of two varieties. Either the particles are
electrons (small pieces on negatively charged matter) or much larger particles consisting of two
protons and two electrons. Nuclear fission differs in that the radioactive material emits atoms





1d. Other naturally occurring elements fission but those elements cannot be found
in any great measure on Earth.
'Id. Chief among these elements is plutonium.
781d.
'91d.





A chain reaction can proceed relatively slowly and be
controlled, as it is in the production of electrical power in nuclear
power plants.8 3 It is also possible, however, for a chain reaction to
proceed very rapidly, so rapidly that it spins out of control.8 In such
cases, enormous amounts of energy in the form of heat and radiation
are released.8 5 This is the essence of a nuclear explosion and the
principle behind the atomic bomb.
To manufacture a nuclear weapon, it is necessary to first
obtain sufficient fissionable material to go critical.8 6 The second
requirement is to combine this material into one mass and then hold it
together for a sufficient amount of time.87 Primitive fission bombs,
like those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were composed of
two pieces of fissionable material, each of subcritical material, but
when combined attained a super critical mass.88 These several pieces
were driven together, or imploded, with explosive force using
conventional chemical explosives. 89 This process produced a
fissionable critical mass of super density, which then exploded.90
The result is the mushroom cloud of smoke and the massive
explosion all of us conceptualize in our minds.
C. Paducah and the Fissionable Materials Production Process
Of great importance to this Note is not the makeup of the
bomb, but the process by which fissionable material is produced for
the bomb. It is in this production process that the PGDP plays a key
role.
The very first requirement for building nuclear weapons is
the ability to manufacture fissionable materials. Only three isotopes,
however, are capable of fission and but one of these elements occurs
naturally (Uranium 235). 91 The other two isotopes are Uranium 233
and a new element called Plutonium, both of which must be produced
synthetically in nuclear reactors.92
The starting point in the fissionable materials production
process is the refinement of Uranium 235.93 Although it occurs













J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
much more abundant quantities of Uranium 238.94 Because Uranium
235 and Uranium 238 are chemically identical and physically similar,
their separation is very difficult. 95 The most successful method of
separation is known as gaseous diffusion (the process undertaken by
the Paducah plant).96 This process is achieved when a gaseous
compound of Uranium called Uranium Hexafluoride is passed
through molecular sieves or filters.97 Due to the fact that Uranium
235 is slightly smaller, the filtration process retains the larger
Uranium 238 molecules and discharges the smaller uranium 235
particles through the other side of the sieve. 98 The distilled Uranium
235 is termed enriched Uranium, while the remaining Uranium 238 is
called depleted Uranium.99
The first gaseous diffusion plant was the K-25 facility at Oak
Ridge.' ° As enormous as that facility was, however, its production
capacity was soon outpaced by the rapid growth of the nuclear
weapons program.' 0' Accordingly, the U.S. government elected to
build two more gaseous diffusion plants: one in Paducah and the
other just outside of Portsmouth, Ohio. 10 2 The K-25 facility, the
PGDP and the Portsmouth facility combined to produce the bulk of
Uranium 235 used at the height of the Cold War.
10 3
The enrichment of Uranium 235 was the principal function of
the Paducah plant. Hence, the alleged mishandling of the procedures
employed in this process and the materials created by it serve as the
impetus of the current suits by Paducah employees. An
understanding of the processes undertaken by the PGDP and similar
facilities is therefore essential to a complete understanding of the
current employee suits being brought by former nuclear complex
employees. The legal framework behind the suits is the other piece
necessary for understanding and analysis. Accordingly, it is the
subject of the proceeding and final section of this Note.
V. A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEE WRONGFUL EXPOSURE SUITS
As one scholar has noted: "Nuclear power, toxic chemicals,
pesticides, dangerous drugs and other products of twentieth-century





"Adams, supra note 10, at 38.
"Id.







with an enormous challenge.. .The delicate balance between assuring
safety and encouraging economic development and innovation is
increasingly difficult to maintain."' 4 A study of radiation employee
suits illustrates that the scholar's statement is prophetic. In just over
ten years of adjudication, U.S. district and circuit courts have
struggled with the numerous complex and difficult issues presented
by wrongful exposure suits brought by nuclear complex employees.
This Note attempts to draw broad conclusions on how those courts
have thus far dealt with those issues.
A. Class Action Status Issues
The PGDP and its sister facilities have employed thousands
of people since they opened their doors in the 1950's. As alleged,
radiation exposure and other dangerous plant conditions would have
affected large segments of employees simultaneously. Accordingly,
the decade or so of employee exposure litigation has seen numerous
motions and arguments for and against class certification.
The class action has been justified on several levels. First,
class actions can accomplish significant judicial economy. 105 Second,
a single action obviates the inequality often present in piecemeal
litigation." 6 Third, class actions increase access to the courts for
litigants with limited resources and common claims. 10 7 Finally, class
actions protect the defendant from inconsistent obligations.1
0 8
There are two overriding requirements for initiating a class
action-numerosity and typicality. As the Supreme Court has
pronounced, in a class action a representative or representatives with
typical claims sue on behalf of the class when the question is of
common or general interest to persons so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court.109 When the class is
well chosen, the procedure affords protection to the rights of the
absent, "which would satisfy the requirements of due process...."110
With numerosity present in most nuclear employee cases,
lawyers on behalf of government contractors have attempted to
obviate the plaintiffs' motions for class certification by focusing on
the requirement of typicality. The typicality requirement is intended
'4Robert A. Borer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technology, Risk
Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 83 (1984).
'O'HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS, Vol. 1, § 1.01 (1992); See also General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159
(1982).
°6lUnited States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980).
'O71d. at 402-03.
"ld. at 403.
t09Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363-64 (1921).
"1 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940).
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to ensure that the representatives' claims are similar enough to those
of the remaining class members, so that the representatives will
adequately represent the class."' Consequently, defendants have
argued that the differences between class members as to the work
they performed, the duration of their employment and their personal
health habits make class adjudication impossible." 2
The defendants' arguments have encountered only limited
success. Representative of this is the Femald litigation. In one of the
many decisions to come out of the dispute, the district court held that
the class of employees was certifiable as to the liability portion of the
case but not to the damages phase.'13 Citing Sterling v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp.,1 14 the court stated that "[i]n mass tort accidents, the
factual and legal issues of a defendant's liability do not differ
dramatically from one plaintiff to the next. No matter how
individualized the issue of damages may be, these issues may be
reserved for individual treatment with the question of liability tried as
a class action."' 15 The court reasoned that, despite the individualism
of the plant workers, the focus of the claims was on the alleged
misconduct of the plant operators, making class adjudication of
liability proper.'16
The framework developed by the Day court is certainly
possible in the two Paducah employee suits. Although the thousands
of workers potentially represented in the suits performed many
different tasks and were exposed to varying levels of radiation, the
focus of the suits is still on the alleged misconduct of the plant
operators. Technically speaking, because of the complex nature of
the claims and the functions performed at the PGDP, the Paducah
suits do not really meet the high standard for typicality. Nonetheless,
the Paducah court will likely be inclined to follow the approach of the
Day and Sterling courts. That is, confronted with the enormous
challenge of fairly litigating hundreds of toxic tort claims, the court
will opt for a compromise-class status as to liability and individual
treatment as to compensatory damages.
B. Workers' Compensation Issues
Invariably, the largest obstacle to plaintiff recovery in
radiation worker litigation is the exclusivity of the workers'
"'General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
'2See, e.g., Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 884 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (hereinafter "Day
I",).
'Id. at 884.
14855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6" Cir. 1988).




compensation remedy.' 17  Upon a successful assertion by the
defendant, the plaintiffs risk having the majority of their state tort law
claims nullified. In exchange, plaintiffs are left with the often less
lucrative statutory compensation for their work related injuries.
Most radiation plaintiffs bring their damage claims under the
penumbra of the Price Anderson Act,'18 the federal pronouncement
that extends a cause of action to private citizens who have been
affected by a nuclear incident. In fact, it is this Act that grants
jurisdiction to the federal courts in most, if not all, radiation worker
suits. While the Price Anderson Act seemingly places the plaintiffs'
claims under federal law, section 2014(hh) of the Act provides that
"substantive rule[s]" for decision in such actions shall be governed by
principles of state law.119 Thus, the issue of whether workers'
compensation statutes bar employee tort claims will be an issue that
is resolved by the statutory and case law of the state in which the
facility is located.12
0
The history of workers' compensations systems is well
rooted. The U.S. imported the law of workers' compensation from
England in the early 1900,S.121 Its adoption, in the wake of the
Industrial Revolution, was intended to alleviate the needs of
employees injured on the job.122 The basic effect of all workers'
compensation systems, though each varies from state to state, is that
they strike a compromise between employers and employees.1
2 3
When an employee is injured by conditions that arise out of his or her
employment, the employee is automatically compensated, regardless
of the employer's culpability for the employee's injuries.' 24 In
exchange, the employer gains immunity from suit from the
employee. 125 That is, the employee waives his or her right to sue
under state tort law, while the employer waives his right to assert a
defense that might otherwise thwart the employee's action.'
26
While most injuries suffered at the workplace are
encompassed by the workers' compensation framework, there are
some general exceptions. 27 Two of the principle exceptions are
"'See e.g., The Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dept., et. al. v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 756
F. Supp. 492,493 (D. Colo. 1991); Day v. NLO, 811 F. Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(hereinafter "Day 11").




' 2"See, e.g., Bldg. and Constr. Trades Dept., 756 F. Supp. at 493.
12LaUra Quackenbush, Note, Worker's Compensation Exclusivity and Wrong1ul












Quackenbush, supra note 12 1, at 1234.
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intentional torts and solely emotional damages. 28 That is, when the
employer either commits an intentional tortious act against the
employee or through mental devices commits an emotional injury'
29
against the employee, the employer will not be insulated from suit by
the workers' compensation statutes.
The intentional tort exception has been carved out of the
exclusivity provision of workers' compensation because it
necessarily occurs outside the employment relationship. 130 Although
states have elucidated the test for intentional torts in different ways,
some generalizations can be made. First, the employee will have to
demonstrate that the employer knew of the existence of the danger to
the employee.131 Second, the employee will have to prove that the
employer was aware that the employee was practically certain to be
injured by the dangerous condition. 132 Finally, the employee must
demonstrate that the employer forced the employee to continue
performing the dangerous task.133  Satisfaction of all three
prerequisites is a heavy burden for a radiation plaintiff to carry at
trial. Nonetheless, damage claims stemming from intentional tort
allegations will be the most likely to survive summary judgment. 
134
By contrast, the purely emotional damages exception to the
workers' compensation doctrine is often a more insurmountable
obstacle to a radiation plaintiff. 35 It is only logical that many states
would be leery of granting workers' compensation benefits to
claimants with only mental injuries. Nonetheless, states generally
accept emotional damage claims where the psychic harm was caused
by a physical stimulus at the workplace. 36 Therefore, the only variety
of emotional distress not covered by workers' compensation is that of
a purely emotional harm caused by an emotional stimulus.1
37 In all
radiation employee suits brought thus far, however, the stimulus of
the plaintiffs' mental injuries has been corporeal-the stimulus being
radioactive material that has leaked or exposure by an individual





1d. at 1235-36; See also Day 11, 811 F. Supp. at 1277-78.
1
2L.e. Intentional infliction of emotional distress through some sort of psychological
device. The source cannot be a physical one. See Quackenbush, supra note 121, at 1236; See
also Day 11, 811 F. Supp. at 1278.
13
0
Day H, 811 F. Supp. at 1278.
3 




'35See id. at 1279-80.
36
Dayf1, 811 F. Supp at 1278.
13id.
3'Exposure to tangible, radioactive materials is certainly alleged in the Paducah
suits. Tom Loflus, Federal Judge Unseals Lawsuit Filed by Three Workers at Paducah Plant
COURIER J. (Louisville), Aug. 13, 1999, available at 1999 WL5667155. In other high profile
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WRONGFUL EXPOSURE SUITS
Glancing at early allegations in the Paducah litigation, it
appears that the plaintiff-employees may be pursuing yet a third
exception to the workers' compensation doctrine.14 The common law
has long recognized that fraudulent concealment of an employee's
injury falls outside the framework of the workers' compensation
scheme.1 41 The Paducah plaintiffs have alleged that plant operators
concealed the existence of hazardous plant conditions from
government overseers and plant employees and consistently failed to
inform employees of their known exposure to high levels of
radioactivity.1 42 Hence, it is reasonable to predict that the Paducah
plaintiffs will attempt to obviate the exclusivity of workers'
compensation remedies by alleging both that plant operators
committed intentional torts against their employees as well as
fraudulently concealed employee injuries.
As to the second allegation, courts have been stingy in
lowering the bar of the workers' compensation remedy.
43 Employee
suits involving allegations of deceit, fraud, and false representation
can best be sorted out by distinguishing between cases in which
deceit precedes and helps to produce the injury and those cases in
which the deceit follows the injury and produces a second 
harm.14
Courts generally bar tort claims in the first instance because the
deception at issue merges into the injury for which compensation is
provided.145 It is only the second category, in which tort actions have
been allowed.
46
As the Building & Construction Trades Dept. court held,
suits by radiation workers fit within the first category and are thus
barred by the workers' compensation doctrine. 147 The gravamen of
most radiation employee suits is that the continued concealment of
their injuries and the passage of time have compounded the damage
done to their bodies. 148 From this, it is evident that both the alleged
deception and the alleged injury merge.' 49 In order to prevail,
radiation plaintiffs would have to prove that concealment caused
successive and distinct injuries-an unlikely proposition.
radiation worker suits, it has also been alleged that exposure to radioactive materials led to
mental harm. See Day 11, 811 F.Supp. at 1274; Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dept., 756 F. Supp. at
493.
'"See Day 1, 811 F. Supp. at 1280.
"he Paducah suits allege that the plaint's operators willfully concealed dangerous
conditions at the plant. See Loftus, supra note 137.
141Quackenbush, supra note 121, at 1235-36.
142,oftus, supra note 138.
14'Building & Construction Trades Dept., 756 F.Supp. at 495.
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In the end, the most significant obstacle for the Paducah
plaintiffs will be the workers' compensation bar to their state law tort
claims. Absent proof that plant operators intentionally harmed their
employees, the Paducah plaintiffs will be hard pressed to obviate the
exclusivity of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation provisions.
C. Federal Sovereign Immunity and Preemption Defenses
The remedy exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation scheme is not the only potential obstacle standing in
the path of radiation plaintiffs. Plant operators also have three federal
immunity and preemption defenses at their disposal: the derivative
sovereign immunity defense, the intergovernmental immunity
defense, and the government contractor's defense. 50 These defenses
have been used to varying degrees of success in both employee as
well as property owner radiation suits.
The PGDP, like its sister facilities, is owned by the federal
government and run by private contractors bound by federal
contracts. 151 Under the terms of the nuclear facility management and
operation contracts, the federal government agrees to indemnify the
contractors for any judgments and litigation expenses incurred in
relation to their operation of the plant. 15 2 Therefore, any expenses
incurred by the contractors in defense of a civil suit might expend
against federal funds.
In Brown v. General Seres. Admin.,15 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a suit against an "officer of the United States is one
against the United States itself . .if the judgment sought would
expend itself against the public treasury or domain. . .,,s This
holding is not unqualified, however. Government contractors are not
automatically cloaked with governmental immunity.' 5 In order to
gain immunity, the contractor must demonstrate that it is so
incorporated into the government structure that it is a mere
instrumentality of the United States. 5 6 In United States v. Boyd, 7 a
case involving a nuclear facility management contract, the Supreme
Court held that "for profit" contractors do not qualify for sovereign
immunity.' 58 Such contractors, because of their "cost plus," "for
"'OSee, e.g., Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D.
Ky. 1993).
'See Adams, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
"5
2
See generally Price Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2286(h) (2000).
s3425 U.S. 820 (1976),
'41d. at 826-27.






profit" status, are more than mere instrumentalities.159 Accordingly,
any defenses under the derivative sovereign immunity doctrine are
likely to fail in worker radiation suits.
The intergovernmental immunity defense, though similar to
the derivative sovereign immunity defense, is of a slightly different
character. The defense arises out of the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution. 16 The general principle is that a state
cannot regulate an activity of the federal government. 161 "Thus, 'a
federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded
from direct state regulation, even though the federal function is
carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes
such regulation. ""162
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the analysis should
focus on whether the state law at issue controls the federal
enterprise. 163 In the tort context, a state regulation would seemingly
be impermissible if it exacted a standard of care that differed from the
enunciated federal standard of care.' 64 The state standard, however, is
permissible so long as it is consistent with federal guidelines.
16
Because the courts have narrowly construed the intergovernmental
immunity defense to discrepancies between state and federal
standards, which often do not exist, defense challenges on this basis
are not likely to pose a serious threat to the claims of radiation
plaintiffs.' 66
The final defense discussed in this section, the government
contractor's defense, is a form of federal preemption. 167 Generally,
federal law preempts state law where the action involves a unique
federal interest, and where a significant conflict exists between the
state and the federal law, or where the application of state law would
frustrate specific federal legislative objectives. 168 The first category,
also referred to as field preemption, is the most relevant to cases
involving federal nuclear weapons facilities.
It is beyond question that a suit involving the operations of a
nuclear production facility involves a unique federal interest. 169 As








1d. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,426 (1819)).
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1"See, e.g., Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky.
1993) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (1819)).
1671d.
'6Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
'6Lamb, 835 F.Supp. at 965.
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the DOE, as agent of the United States, is the exclusive owner of all
nuclear production facilities . . .This federal control over the
production of nuclear material is an important aspect of federal
nuclear energy policy."' 70 Given this, the issue becomes whether the
state regulation operates contrary to federal policy. 17'
The landmark case in this area is Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.17 1 In Boyle, the Court held that a conflict arises
when state tort law duties run contrary to federal interests identified
in the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 73 Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the government waives its sovereign immunity with respect to
negligent or willful actions by government agents but retains its
immunity with respect to discretionary functions. 74 Therefore, the
government contractor defense will prevail if the contractor can show
that its actions were reasonably taken pursuant to government
approval and if it can show that those actions were products of the
government's discretion. 175
This is a difficult burden for contractor-defendants to meet.
It is practically impossible for a contractor to show that every single
action was taken under the direct authority of the federal
government. 76 Further, the kinds of decisions made on a day to day
basis at a weapons facility do not necessarily constitute a
discretionary function. 77 Certainly as to such clams as fraudulent
concealment of radiation leaks and worker exposure, the government
contractor defense is likely to fail.
D. Conclusion
The issues mentioned in this section are but a mere sampling
of the possible field of issues that could arise in the Paducah
litigation. The battlegrounds of legal issues are as wide open as the
imaginations of the litigants. Nonetheless, the issues of class
certification, workers' compensation, and sovereign immunity are
very likely to surface in each phase of the radiation employee suits
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Charles Dickens once wrote, "suffer any indignity that can be
done you rather than come [to the courts of chancery]."
78
Doubtlessly, Dickens was referring to the virtually endless
complexity and unpredictability of the civil trial. Nowhere perhaps is
this more true than in the field of complex environmental litigation,
especially in cases, like radiation exposure cases, where science does
not fully know all the answers. Like it or not, the nuclear age has
been upon us for some time now. Perhaps as a result of the haste
with which we, as humans, sought to unlock the mysteries of the
atom, we are finally getting around to paying the price for our
celerity, or perhaps more time will reveal that the dangers litigants
have alleged in so many suits are merely figments of overactive and
paranoid imaginations. The undeniable truth, however, is that we are
unlikely to ever know the truth.
The film, A Civil Action 79 told the story of the Woburn,
Massachusetts environmental litigation. The real life inspiration for
the film was a civil suit alleging that two companies located in the
town had been dumping dangerous chemicals into the town's water
supply, which in turn caused an anomalous cancer cluster among
local children. Perhaps the moral of this Note is best summarized by
actor Robert Duvall, who played one of the two defense lawyers
portrayed in the film, real life lawyer Jerome Facher. Toward the end
of the film the plaintiff' attorney Jan Schlictman (portrayed by John
Travolta) states that his goal in pursuing the litigation is to reveal the
awful truth of the company's irresponsible and deadly actions. In
response, Duvall's character says "The truth- I thought we were
talking about a court of law here. .. .The truth lies at the bottom of a
bottomless pit.' 80 The same bottomless pit is likely to harbor the
answer to the question posed by the title of this Note. Whether
former PGDP employees and other federal nuclear weapons
employees are 'sunshine patriots' or cold war casualties is a question
that is likely to go unresolved for an indefinite amount of time.
'CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 7 (Norton ed. 1977).
179A CIVIL ACTION (Buena Vista Productions 1998).
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